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"Of dl the u J d I e  +a2 the 
world posses st^, t h  most vats 
abEc md most d8cisive is people." 
The Soviets and the Individual 
By JOSEPH STALIN 
C OMRADES, it m o t  be denied that we have reaendy achieved important successes both in 
the sphere of construction and in the sphere of ad- 
ministration, In this connection there is too much 
talk abut the merits of chiefs, about the merits of 
leaders. All or newly aU our achievemen& art 
mibed to them. ~ h z i  of mum, is wrong, it is in- 
correct. It is not m m l y  a matter of l&. But 
it is not of this I wanted to speak today, I should 
like to say a few words about dm, abut our 
dm in g e n d  and h u t  the d r e a  of our Red 
Army in pad&. 
You know that we inherited from the olden days a 
tachniartfy b a c k d ,  impoverished and ruined corm- 
try. Ruined by four years of imperialist war, wnd 
A d d m  to the graduates of the Red Army Academy, delivered 
in the Knmlk,  May 4, 1935. 
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ruined again by three years of civil war, a country 
with a semi-literate popuIation, with a low fedmid 
level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a d t e r  
of minute peasant f a r d  was the country we 
inherited from the past. The problem was to transfer 
this mutry from the ha of m e d i d  d a r k  to 
the lines of mdem industry and mechanized agri- 
dture. The problem, as you see, was a serious and 
d i W t  one. The question that confronted us was 
that &he we solve this problem in the shortest 
possible time and consolidate Socialism in our coun- 
try, or we do not solve it, in which case our country- 
tedmically weak and d d y  unenlightened- 
would lose its independence and become a stake in 
the game of the imperhht powera 
At that time our country was pa&ng through a 
period of acute famine in technical resources, There 
were not: enough machines for industry. There were 
no machines for sgridhre. There were no-ins 
for transport. There was not that bematttry tech- 
n i d  base without which the industrial transforma- 
tion of a country is ~ n c e i m b 1 e .  AII that existed 
were isolated preliminary raquisitcs for the creation 
of such a b. A 6rstjaSS industry had to k 
created. This industry had to be so directed as to be 
4 
T H E  SOVIETS AtPD THE 1SDIVIDCE.L 
capable of technimlly reorganizl~g nut only industry, 
but also our agriculture and our railway transport. 
And for this it was n- to make sacrifices and 
to impme rigorous economy in everything-; it was 
neewry to economize on food, on schools and on 
cedes, in order to accumulate the funds required 
for the aeation of industry. There was no other 
way of overaoming the famine in technical resow=. 
Thus Lenin taught us, and in this matter we fol- 
lowed in the fmtsteps of Lain.  
Naturally, in so great and di6cult a matter un- 
varying and rapid success muld not be expected. In 
a matter like this success comes only after several 
y m .  We had therefore to arm ourselves with 
strong nerves, Bolshevik grit and stubborn patience 
in order to counteract the first failures and to march 
unswervingly towards the great goal, without per- 
mitting any wavering or uncertainty in our ranks. 
You know that we set about this task in precisely 
this way. But not all our comrades had the necessary 
spirit, patience and grit. Among our mrnrades there 
proved to be people who at the h s t  difficulties began 
to mlZ for a retreat. Let bygones tK bygon~, it is 
said. That, of course, is true. But man is endowed 
with memory, and when summing up the results of 
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our work one invoIuntarily r e d s  the past. ( h g h -  
tsr.) Well then, there were c o d  among us 
who mre scared by the &&ties and b e p  to dl 
on the Party to retreat. They said: "What is the 
god of your industdization and aoUectivization, 
your machines, iron and st& indwtry, tractors, mm- 
bines, automobiles? It would be ktter if you gave 
w more textiles, if you bought more raw materhh 
for the prduction of mmumemJ goods and gave the 
population more of the d thing3 which adorn the 
life of man. The mtion of hdustry, and a first- 
d m  industry at that, when we are so hackward, is 
a dangerous d m . ' '  
Of course, we could have used the three billion 
rubies of foreign c u r m q  obtained as a result of the 
severest economy, and v i l t  on the meation of our 
industry, for the importation of raw materials and 
for increasing the production of articles of general 
consumption. That is also a kind of 'cplan". But 
with such a "plan" we should not have had a metal- 
lurgical industry, w a machine-building industry, or 
tractors and automobiles, or airplanes and lanks. We 
should have found o d v e s  unarmed in the face of 
the external foe. W e  should have undermined the 
foundations of Socialism in o w  country. We should 
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h e  found ourselves in captivity to the burgeoisie, 
home and foreign. 
It is evident that a choim had to be made ktween 
two plans: between the plan of retreat, leading, and 
bound to lead, to the defeat of Sodalism, and the 
plan of advance, which led and, as you how,  has 
h d y  led to the victory of Socialism in our country. 
We chose the plan of advance and moved forward 
along the Leninist road, brushing those 0 0 ~  
aside, as being people who saw something only when 
it was under their ILOSS, but who closed their eyes 
to the immediate future of our country, to the future 
of Socialism in our country. 
But these c o d  did not always confine them- 
selves to criticism and +ve resistanm. They threat- 
ened to raise a mol t  in the Parq against the Centrid 
Committee. More, they threatened some of us with 
bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening us 
and compdbg w to leave the Leninist road. These 
people, apparently, forgot that we Bolsheviks are 
people of a s p e d  cut. They forgot that you annot 
frighten Bolshwh by difhltics or by threats. They 
forgot that we were forged by the great Lain, our 
leader, our t&m, our father, who did not know 
fear in the fight and did not recognize it. They for- 
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got that the more the enemies rage and the more 
hysterical the foes within the Party h m e ,  the more 
red-hot the BoIsheviks become for fresh struggles 
and the more vigorously they push forward 
Of course, it never even occurred to w to leave 
the Leninist road. More, having established our- 
selves on this road, we pushed forward still more 
vigorously, brushing every obstacle from our path. 
It is true that in our course we were obliged to 
handle some of these comrades roughly. But you 
m o t  help that. I must confess that I too took a 
hand in this business. (Lo& cheers.) 
Yes, comrades, we proceeded confidently and vig- 
ornusly along the road of industrializing and collec- 
tivizing our country. And now we may consider that 
the road has been traversed. 
Everybody now admits that we have achieved 
tremendous successes dong this road. Everybody 
now admits that we already have a powerful, first- 
class industry, a powerful mehanized agriculture, a 
growing and improving transport system, an organ- 
ized and excellentIy equipped Red Army. 
This means that we have in the main outlived the 
period of famine in techniml resources. 
But, having outlived the period of famine in tech- 
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nicd resources, we have entered a new period, a 
period, I would say, of famine in the matter of  
people, in the matter of adre, in the matter o f  
workers mpable of harnessing technique and ad- 
vancing it. The point is that we have factories, ds, 
collective farms, Soviet farrns, aa army; we have 
technique for all this; but we lack people with suf- 
ficient experience to squeeze out of technique all that 
can be squeezed out of it. Formerly, we used to say 
that "technique decides every thing'. This slogan 
helped us in this respect, that we put an end to the 
famine in technical resources and rreated an extensive 
techniml base in every branch of activity far the 
equipment of our people with first-class technique. 
That is very good. But it is very, very far from 
enough. In order to set technique going and to util- 
ize it to the full, we need people who have mastered 
technique, we need mdres capable of mastering and 
utilizing this technique according to all the rules of 
the art. Without people who have mastered tech- 
nique, technique is dead. Technique in the charge of  
people who have mastered technique a n  and should 
perform miracles. If  in our first-class mills and 
factories, in our Soviet farms and collective farms 
and in our Red Army we had su6icient d e s  mpable 
of harnessing the technique, our country would se- 
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cure results three times and four times greater than at 
present. That is why emphasis must now be laid on 
people, on d e s ,  on workers who have mastered 
technique. That is why the old slogan, "Technique 
decides everythqf', which is a reflection of a period 
we have M y  p d  through, a period in which 
we suEed  from a famine in technical. res0urce.q 
must now be replaced by a new slogan, the slogan 
"Cndres decide everything'? That is the main thing 
now. 
Ckn it k said that our people have fully under- 
stood and realized the p t  significance of this new 
slogan? I would not say that. Otherwise, there 
would not have been the outrageous attitude towards 
people, ' c o p &  cadres, towards workers, which we 
not infrequently o b e  in practie. The slogan 
"Cadres decide everything: demands that our 1 4 -  
ers should display the most dci tous  attitude t o d '  
our workers, "little" and tCbigl', no matter in what 
sphere they are engaged, cultivating them assidu- 
ously, assisting them when they need support, en- 
couraging them when they display their first suc- 
cesses, advancing them, and so forth. Yet, in practice 
we meet in a number of mses with a soulless, bureau- 
cratic md positively outrageous attitude towards 
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workers. This, indeed, explains why instead of being 
studied, and p l d  at their pasts only after being 
studied, people are frequently flung about like 
pawns. People have learnt how to value machinery 
and to make reports of how many u m h k  we have 
in our d s  and factories. But I do not h o w  of 
one instance when a report was made with equal zest 
of the number of people we have developed in a 
given period, how we & people to grow and 
become tempered in their work How is this to be 
explained? It is to bt explained by the fact that we 
have not yet learnt to value people, to value workers, 
to valk dm. 
I r e d  an incident in Siberia, Where X was at one 
time in exile. It was in the spring, at the time of the. 
spring floods. About thirty men went to h e  river to' 
pull out timber which had been m i e d  away by the 
vast, swollen river. Tow& evening they returned 
to the village, but with one comrade mising, When 
asked where the thiieth man was, they unconcern- 
edly replied that the thirtieth man had "remained 
there". To my quesion, "How do you mean, re- 
mained there?" they replied with the same ucon- 
cern, "Why askArowned, of course." And there- 
upon one of them began to hurry away, sying, "1 
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have got to go and water the mare." When I re- 
proached them for having more concern fer animals 
than for men, one of them, amid the general ap- 
proval of the re-st, said, "Why should we be con- 
cerned about men? We mn alwzys make men. But 
a mare , . , just try and make a mare.', (Lmghtp..) 
Here you haw a ase, not very signifrant perhaps, 
but very characteristic I t  seems to me that the in- 
difference shown by certain of our leaders to people, 
to a h ,  and their inability to d u e  people, is a 
survival of that strange attitude of man to man dis- 
played in the episode in far-off Sikria just dated.  
And so, comrades, if we want successfully to over- 
come the famine it1 the matter of people and to pro- 
vide our country with sufficient mdres, mpable of 
advancing technique and setting it going, we must 
first of all learn to value people, to value &a, to 
value every worker capable of benefiting our common 
muse. 
It is time to realize that of all the valuable 
capital the world possesses, the most valuable and 
most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realized 
that under our present conditions "mdres decide 
everything". If we have good and numerous cadres 
in industry, agriculture, transport and the army- 
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our country will be invincible. If we do not have 
such d m - w e  shall be lame on both  fee^ 
In mnduding my s p e d ,  permit me to offer a 
toast to the health and success of our graduates from 
the Red Axmy M e m y .  I wish them in the 
cause of organizing and leading the defense of our 
country. 
Commdq you have graduated from the a d a n y ,  
a school in which you received your first sttei'ing. 
But school is only a preparatory stage. Cadres receive 
their r d  stding in actual work, outs& school, in 
fighting ditficulties, in overcoming dificuldes. Re- 
member, comrades, that only those dm are any 
good who do not fear di6culties, who do not hide 
from difficulties, but who, on the contrary, go out 
to meet difficulties, in order to overcome them and 
eliminate them. It is only in combating &&dtks 
that real mdres are forged. And if our army posesm 
genuinely steeled cadres in suficient numbers, it w U  
be invincible. 
Your health, comrades! (Storavy apphse. All  
&. L d  chems for Sulk . )  
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